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NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States

*Many in member countries express reservations about fulfilling
Article 5's collective defense obligations*

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How we did this

This analysis focuses on views of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) among 16 member nations and three nonmember nations in Europe and North America. In all, the analysis covers over 90% of the population living in NATO countries.

Pew Research Center has been tracking views of NATO since 2007. This report also includes views of Article 5 obligations, which state that an attack on one NATO country is an attack on all; preferences for close relations with the U.S. versus with Russia; support for the use of military force to maintain order in the world; and agreement with the sentiment that parts of neighboring countries belong to another country.

For this report, we used data from a survey conducted across 19 countries from May 13 to Aug. 12, 2019, among 21,029 respondents. The surveys were conducted face-to-face in Central and Eastern Europe, Greece, Italy, Russia and Ukraine. Surveys were conducted over the phone in North America and Western Europe.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its [methodology](#).

NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States


Many in member countries express reservations about fulfilling Article 5's collective defense obligations

NATO is generally seen in a positive light across publics within the alliance, despite lingering [tensions](#) between the leaders of individual member countries. A median of 53% across 16 member countries surveyed have a favorable view of the organization, with only 27% expressing a negative view. But opinions of NATO and related issues vary widely across the countries surveyed, especially regarding the obligations of Article 5 of the 75-year-old treaty, which declares that an attack against one member nation is considered an attack against all members.

Positive ratings of NATO among members range from a high of 82% in Poland to 21% in Turkey, with the United States and Germany in the middle at 52% and 57%, respectively. And in the three nonmember states surveyed, Sweden and Ukraine see the alliance positively (63% and 53%, respectively), but only 16% of Russians say the same.

NATO seen favorably in member states, but few in Turkey agree

% who have a favorable opinion of NATO




Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g.
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Favorable views of the organization have fluctuated over time among both NATO member and nonmember countries. Since the late 2000s, favorable opinions of NATO are up 10 percentage points or more in Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland. However, positive opinions of NATO are down significantly in Bulgaria, Russia, Germany and France over the past decade, with double-digit percentage point declines in each of these countries. Favorable views of the organization are also down significantly in Spain and the Czech Republic.

Views of NATO have changed in both member countries and among non-NATO members over past decade

% who have a favorable opinion of NATO



Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g. Germany's 2018 results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted there Sept. 13-26, 2018. "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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In addition, across several countries surveyed, favorable views of the organization are related to ideological orientation, with those on the right sharing a more positive view than those on the ideological left.

NATO serves as a political and military alliance for its 29 member states spanning Europe and North America. Founded in 1949 to provide [collective defense](#) against the Soviet Union, the alliance seeks to balance Russian power and influence, in addition to a host of [other operations](#).


Despite the organization's largely favorable ratings among member states, there is widespread reluctance to fulfill the collective defense commitment outlined in [Article 5](#) of NATO's founding treaty. When asked if their country should defend a fellow NATO ally against a potential attack from Russia, a median of 50% across 16 NATO member states say their country *should not* defend an ally, compared with 38% who say their country *should* defend an ally against a Russian attack.

Publics are more convinced that the U.S. *would* use military force to defend a NATO ally from Russia. A median of 60% say the U.S. would defend an ally against Russia, while just 29% say the U.S. would not do so. And in most NATO member countries surveyed, publics are more likely to say the U.S. *would* defend a NATO ally from a Russian attack than say their own country *should* do the same.

In terms of transatlantic relations, some Western European publics prefer a close relationship with the U.S., but many others prefer a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia. Nevertheless, few want to prioritize their relationship with Russia over their U.S. relations. Ideology also relates to views of potential allies: Those on the right in several countries are more likely than those on the left to prefer a relationship with the U.S.

NATO publics more likely to believe U.S. would defend them from Russian attack than to say their own country should

% who say if Russia got into a serious military conflict with one of its neighboring countries that is our NATO ally, ___ to defend that country



Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**. The U.S., Russia and Ukraine were not asked both questions. Bulgaria not included due to a translation error.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q24 & Q25. "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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Despite the reservations many have about NATO's Article 5 commitments, half or more in nearly every country surveyed agree it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world. In most countries surveyed, those who say military force is sometimes necessary are also more likely to agree that their country should use military force to defend a fellow NATO ally.

These views have changed significantly over the past decade in some countries. In Ukraine, Russia, Slovakia and Germany, more say military force is sometimes necessary than said the same in 2007. And in Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, publics have grown less inclined to agree.

On the topic of territorial ambitions, when asked if there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to their country, relatively few surveyed agree. However, among NATO member states, majorities in Hungary, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria agree that parts of other countries belong to them. In many European countries, those with a favorable view of right-wing populist parties are more likely to support this statement.

These are among the key findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 19 countries, including 16 [NATO member states](#), Sweden, Russia and Ukraine. The survey was conducted among 21,029 people from May 13 to Aug. 12, 2019. Throughout this report, German results are occasionally sourced from a series of surveys conducted in Germany by [Körber-Stiftung](#), in partnership with Pew Research Center.

NATO viewed favorably across member states, though opinions have shifted over time

Across the 16 [NATO member countries](#) surveyed, NATO is generally seen in a positive light. A median of 53% across these countries have a favorable view of the organization, while a median of 27% have an unfavorable opinion. In 13 of these countries, roughly half or more have a positive view of NATO.

Among NATO member countries, positive views of the organization range from 82% in Poland to 21% in Turkey. Majorities of people in Poland, Lithuania, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany rate NATO positively in Europe. Opinions are also relatively positive in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, France, Spain, Hungary and Bulgaria.


Canadians and Americans hold positive views of NATO, with 66% in Canada and 52% in the U.S. expressing favorable opinions.

In Turkey and Greece, publics are particularly unfavorable toward the alliance: Roughly half or more express a negative opinion.

Among the three non-NATO countries surveyed, views of the alliance are mixed. In Sweden and Ukraine, more than half have a favorable view of NATO. But in Russia, 60% have an *unfavorable* view of the organization, while just 16% view it favorably, the smallest share across all countries surveyed.

Views of NATO

% who have a ___ opinion of NATO



Note: Don't know responses not shown. Sweden, Ukraine and Russia are not NATO member states.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g. "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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Views of NATO have fluctuated since Pew Research Center began asking this question in 2007. In non-NATO-member Ukraine, for example, 34% said they had a favorable view of the organization in 2007. In 2019, 53% said the same, an increase of 19 percentage points. Lithuanians and Poles have also grown more favorable toward NATO over the past 10 to 12 years (increases of 18 and 10 points, respectively).

Several countries have soured on the alliance over that period. In France, favorable views of NATO dropped from 71% in 2009 to 49% in 2019, a decrease of 22 percentage points. In Germany, favorable views of the organization declined by 16 points, and in Bulgaria favorable views are down by 12 points. In nonmember Russia, positive views have been nearly cut in half: In 2007, 30% had a favorable view of NATO. By 2019, just 16% expressed the same sentiment.

NATO favorability over time

% who have a favorable opinion of NATO

	2007	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
NATO member countries	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
U.S.	-	53	54	54	51	49	-	49	53	62	64	52
Canada	-	-	-	-	-	57	-	56	56	66	-	66
France	-	71	68	70	67	58	-	64	49	60	-	49
Germany	-	73	57	60	65	59	-	55	59	67	63	57
Greece	-	-	-	-	20	25	-	-	25	33	-	37
Italy	-	64	-	-	61	60	-	64	59	57	-	60
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72	79	-	72
Spain	-	56	53	62	45	42	-	47	44	45	-	49
UK	-	63	60	63	62	59	-	60	61	62	-	65
Bulgaria	54	54	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
Czech Rep.	60	66	-	-	51	56	-	-	-	-	-	54
Hungary	-	57	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	60	-	48
Lithuania	-	59	-	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
Poland	72	75	77	72	70	64	-	74	70	79	-	82
Slovakia	53	59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51
Turkey	-	-	-	18	15	25	19	23	-	23	-	21
Non-NATO countries												
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58	65	-	63
Russia	30	24	40	37	22	27	-	12	-	-	-	16
Ukraine	34	31	-	34	-	-	-	58	-	-	-	53

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g. Germany's 2018 results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted there Sept. 13-26, 2018. "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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
In U.S., views of NATO differ among Democrats and Republicans

Americans' views of NATO differ by political party affiliation. Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents have been more likely to have a favorable opinion of NATO than Republicans and Republican-leaning independents across most years. That remained true in 2019, as 61% of Democrats had a positive view of the alliance, compared with 45% of Republicans.

Democrats consistently more favorable toward NATO than Republicans

% of U.S. adults who have a favorable view of NATO

100%



Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g.
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
Both Democratic and Republican views of NATO remained generally stable until 2017, when Democrats grew much more likely to support NATO than their counterparts, a difference that has not changed significantly since. In 2017, 74% of Democrats and 48% of Republicans had a favorable opinion of the alliance, a difference of 26 percentage points. Since 2018, U.S. views of NATO have declined among supporters of both parties. Positive views among Democrats fell 15 points, while views among Republicans dropped 7 points.

Those on the right tend to have a more positive view of NATO

Ideology is a factor when it comes to views of NATO in several countries. In six countries, those placing themselves on the right side of the ideological spectrum are more favorable toward NATO than those on the left. In Sweden, for example, 79% of those on the ideological right have a positive opinion of NATO, compared with 38% of those on the left, a difference of 41 percentage points. Significant differences between those on the right and the left are also seen in Bulgaria (38 percentage points), the Czech Republic (36 points), Spain (25), Greece (19) and Slovakia (16).

Those on the ideological right more favorable toward NATO

% who have a favorable view of NATO



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.
Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q8g.
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Public reluctance on Article 5 obligations across NATO member countries


[Article 5 of the NATO treaty](#) is “at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty,” according to the organization. The article states that “an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.”

When asked whether their country should or should not use military force to defend a NATO ally from a hypothetical attack by Russia, in only five of the 16 member states surveyed – the Netherlands, the U.S., Canada, the UK and Lithuania – do half or more say that they should use such force. Across the 16 countries, a median of 50% say that their country should not defend a NATO ally in the event of an attack by Russia, while 38% say they should.

Larger shares in 10 NATO member countries surveyed say their country *should not* use force to defend a NATO ally should there be an attack by Russia. This includes majorities in Bulgaria, Italy, Greece, Germany and Spain. In Poland, sentiment is divided.

Publics in NATO countries express reluctance on Article 5 obligations

% who say if Russia got into a serious military conflict with one of its neighboring countries that is our NATO ally, (survey country) ___ use military force to defend that country



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q24.

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
The belief that their country should respond to a hypothetical Russian attack on a NATO ally has become less common over time in a handful of countries. For example, in Italy, only a quarter in 2019 say that their country should defend a NATO ally, down from four-in-ten in 2015. Similar declines over this time period occurred in Poland (-8 percentage points), Spain (-7) and France (-6). However, support for protecting a fellow NATO nation has increased in the UK since 2015 (+6).

In eight of the countries polled, men are significantly more likely than women to say that their country should defend a NATO ally. For example, in Germany, 43% of men say that in the case of a Russian attack on a fellow NATO member their country should respond with force, compared with only a quarter of women. Similar double-digit differences occur in Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland.

Ideology also plays a role in people's views about coming to an ally's aid. In six countries, those who place themselves on the right end of the ideological spectrum are more willing to say they should defend a NATO ally than those on the left. This includes double-digit differences between right and left in all six countries: Spain (30 percentage points), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (21 points), Greece (14), and the UK and Italy (both 13 points).

Changing views on whether their country should intervene in a conflict between Russia and a NATO ally

% who say their country *should* use military force to defend a NATO ally in a serious military conflict with Russia



Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q24.
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Views on defending an ally from a potential Russian attack are related to general attitudes toward the use of military force. Across most of the NATO member countries surveyed, those who agree that military force is sometimes necessary to maintain order in the world are more likely to say that they would defend a fellow NATO member from an armed incursion than those who disagree that a military solution is the best choice for keeping order. For example, in Spain, 53% of those who agree that military force is sometimes necessary say they would come to the aid of a NATO ally, versus only 26% of those who disagree with the principle of military force – a 27 percentage point difference.

Those who agree military force is sometimes necessary are more likely to support defending a NATO ally

% who say their country should use military force to defend a NATO ally from a serious military conflict with Russia

	Disagree that military force is sometimes necessary	Agree that military force is sometimes necessary	Diff
	%	%	
Poland	23	51	+28
Spain	26	53	+27
Lithuania	38	65	+27
Canada	38	64	+26
Italy	12	38	+26
Netherlands	47	72	+25
UK	37	62	+25
Czech Rep.	24	49	+25
Slovakia	20	45	+25
Germany	23	47	+24
Hungary	18	40	+22
U.S.	47	64	+17
France	30	47	+17
Bulgaria	9	17	+8
Greece	23	29	+6
Turkey	29	34	+5

Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, Q24 & Q50h.

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In contrast to skeptical opinions on whether their own country should come to the defense of a NATO ally, people are much more likely to think the U.S. would take military action in response to a Russian attack.

A median of 60% across the member countries say the U.S. would use military force to defend a NATO country that was subject to a Russian incursion. Only 29% across these countries believe the U.S. would not defend the country that was attacked.

Roughly two-thirds or more in Italy, the UK, Spain, Canada, the Netherlands and Greece say the U.S. would defend a NATO ally. Majorities in Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and France agree.


Poles, on balance, say the U.S. would help out should Russia use military force against a neighboring NATO country, but sentiment is more divided in Turkey, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Since 2015, there has been some change in a few countries on this question. The belief that the U.S. would defend a NATO ally is down 8 percentage points in France but up 7 points in the UK and Spain. These sentiments are also up 6 points in Turkey.

In Hungary, views that the U.S. would help out in the event of a Russia attack are down significantly since 2017, falling 16 percentage points.

People in member states say the U.S. would defend a NATO ally

% who say if Russia got into a serious military conflict with one of its neighboring countries that is our NATO ally, the U.S. ___ use military force to defend that country



Note: Don't know responses not shown. Question not asked in the U.S. Due to a translation error, results are not shown for Bulgaria. Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q25. "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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Young adults in Spain, France, Slovakia, Canada and Germany are more likely to believe the U.S. would defend a NATO ally against a Russian attack. For example, in Spain, 84% of 18- to 29-year-olds say the U.S. would uphold their Article 5 obligations, compared with 68% of those 50 and older.

In almost every country surveyed, people are significantly more likely to say the U.S. would defend an ally from a Russia attack than say their own country should take such action.

The biggest difference measured is in Italy, where three-quarters say the U.S. would use such military force in such a scenario, compared with only a quarter who say Italy should defend that NATO ally, a 50 percentage point difference. Similar differences are seen in Greece (40 points), Spain (31), Germany (29), Slovakia (25), the UK (18), France (16), Turkey (14) and Canada (13).

More in NATO countries say the U.S. would use military force to defend an ally from Russia than say that their country should do the same

% who say if Russia got into a serious military conflict with one of its neighboring countries that is our NATO ally, ___ to defend that country

	Our country should use military force %	The U.S. would use military force %	Diff
Italy	25	75	+50
Greece	25	65	+40
Spain	41	72	+31
Germany	34	63	+29
Slovakia	32	57	+25
UK	55	73	+18
France	41	57	+16
Turkey	32	46	+14
Canada	56	69	+13
Poland	40	47	+7
Hungary	33	39	+6
Lithuania	51	57	+6
Czech Rep.	36	41	+5
Netherlands	64	68	+4

Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**. U.S., Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine not included.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q24 & Q25.

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Many NATO countries in Europe value a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia

In nearly every country surveyed, larger shares support close ties with the U.S. than with Russia, with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Slovakia. And in many countries polled, publics tend to volunteer that a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia is important.


Particularly in Western Europe, the share of the public that says a relationship with the U.S. is more important is substantial. For example, in the UK and the Netherlands, about eight-in-ten support ties with the U.S. over Russia or both. And in Sweden, a non-NATO state, 71% support closer ties with the U.S. than with Russia (11%) or both countries (9%).

Choosing a close relationship with Russia over the U.S. is considerably less widespread across the countries surveyed.

Bulgarians are the most prone to this point of view, but just 28% say a close relationship with Russia is more important for their country. A quarter of Germans [say it is important](#) for their country to have a close relationship with Russia, compared with 39% who favor a close relationship with the U.S. Three-in-ten Germans volunteer that a close relationship with both countries would be preferable.

Western Europeans favor close relationship with U.S. over Russia; Central and Eastern Europeans tend to prefer both

% who say it is more important for their country to have a close relationship to ...



Note: "Both" indicates volunteered response "Both relationships are equally important." "Don't know" and "Neither" responses not shown. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted in Germany Sept. 9-28, 2019.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q35.

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
Central and Eastern European publics tend to volunteer their preference for a close relationship with both the U.S. and Russia. In Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria, roughly half or more say a relationship with both countries is important. And in Italy, Greece, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, about four-in-ten or more say the same.

Ideology is linked to views of closer relations with the U.S. In 11 of 14 countries, those on the ideological right are more likely to support a close relationship with the U.S. than those on the left. In the Czech Republic, for example, 40% of those on the right say a close relationship with the U.S. is more important, compared to 15% of those on the left, a difference of 25 percentage points.

Hungary is an exception. Hungarians on the left (40%) are almost twice as likely as their counterparts on the right (21%) to support close U.S. relations.

Those on right ideologically more likely to favor close relationship with U.S.

% who say it is more important for their country to have a close relationship to the U.S.



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
 Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q35.
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Most NATO and non-NATO countries believe military force is sometimes necessary


There is widespread support across most of the NATO countries surveyed for the use of military force to maintain order in the world. A median of 57% across 16 member countries agree that military force is sometimes necessary, while a median of 36% disagree.

Across most countries surveyed – both members of NATO and those that do not belong to the organization – about half or more support the use of military force to maintain order. And in seven countries (Sweden, the U.S., Canada, the UK, Turkey, Russia and Hungary) seven-in-ten or more hold this view.

Germans are more divided, with 47% saying that military force is sometimes necessary and a similar 52% disagreeing with that statement. In Bulgaria, only 38% say military force is sometimes necessary.

Across most of Europe and North America, support for military force to maintain order in the world

% who ___ that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world



Note: Don't know responses not shown. Sweden, Ukraine and Russia are not NATO member states.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50h.

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Support for military force has changed since Pew Research Center asked this question in 2007.

For example, in both Ukraine and Russia, two countries engaged in conflict since 2014, publics increasingly say military force is sometimes necessary (by 11 and 9 percentage points, respectively). This opinion has also become more common in Slovakia and Germany.

Yet in several European countries, support for military force has waned. This is the case in Italy (a decrease of 21 percentage points), Spain (10 points) and the Czech Republic (9).

Views of military force have changed across several countries

% who agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world

	2007	2019	Change
	%	%	
Ukraine	51	62	▲ 11
Russia	61	70	▲ 9
Slovakia	47	53	▲ 6
Germany	41	47	▲ 6
Czech Rep.	62	53	▼ 9
Spain	65	55	▼ 10
Italy	73	52	▼ 21

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50h.
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
In 12 countries, people on the right of the ideological spectrum are more apt than those on the left to agree that military force can be justified. In Spain, for example, those on the right are about twice as likely to support military force as their counterparts on the left.

In the U.S., conservatives are 25 percentage points more likely than liberals to say military force is sometimes needed. Similarly, 91% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say military force is sometimes necessary, while 71% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents agree.

Gender also shapes views of military action. Across most of the NATO and non-NATO countries surveyed, men are more likely than women believe in the need for military force. In the Czech Republic, for example, 63% of men say military force is sometimes necessary, compared with 45% of women. And in Ukraine, 71% of men support military force, versus 56% of women. Double-digit gender differences are also present in Germany (14 points), Poland (12), Bulgaria (12), Hungary (11), Italy (11) and Spain (10).

Those on the right more likely to say military force can be necessary to maintain order

% who agree that it is sometimes necessary to use military force to maintain order in the world



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant. In U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).
 Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50h.
 "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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Are there parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us?

Across NATO and non-NATO countries, there is disagreement over whether parts of neighboring countries really belong to them. A median of 45% across the 16 NATO countries surveyed disagree, while a median of 35% agree (in several countries, the share who did not express an opinion is relatively high).

The shares who agree with this statement are highest in Central and Eastern European countries surveyed. About two-thirds of Hungarians (67%) agree that parts of neighboring countries belong to them, including 40% who *completely* agree. In Turkey, 58% agree that parts of nearby countries belong to them. And in neighboring Greece, 60% say the same.


In Western European countries, sentiments tend to run in the opposite direction. In Sweden (82%), the Netherlands (74%), the UK (72%), Germany (62%), Spain (60%) and France (59%), majorities *disagree* that there are parts of other countries that belong to them.

In both the U.S. and Canada, publics overwhelmingly disagree that parts of other countries belong to them (73% and 65%, respectively). However, a quarter of Canadians and roughly one-in-five Americans say the opposite and agree that there are parts of neighboring countries that belong to them.

Russians and Ukrainians tend to agree that parts of neighboring countries belong to them (53% and 47%, respectively).

Europeans divided over whether parts of neighboring countries belong to them

% who ___ that there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us



Note: Don't know responses not shown. Sweden, Ukraine and Russia are not NATO member states.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50f. "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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In Europe, supporters of right-wing populist parties tend to be more likely to say parts of neighboring countries belong to their country. Supporters of right-wing populist parties are more likely to agree with this statement for nearly every European right-wing populist party included in the survey. In Spain, for example, those who have a favorable view of Vox are 27 percentage points more likely to say parts of another country belong to Spain than those who do not have a favorable view of the party.

Those with a favorable view of right-wing populist parties more likely to say parts of other countries belong to them

% who agree that there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us

		Among those who do not support ___ party	Among those who support ___ party	Diff
		%	%	
Spain	Vox	32	59	+27
France	National Rally	28	52	+24
Germany	AfD	26	50	+24
UK	UKIP	17	41	+24
Czech Rep.	Freedom and Direct Democracy	27	45	+18
Hungary	Fidesz	60	76	+16
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	40	54	+14
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy	19	33	+14
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	21	33	+12
Italy	Lega	33	43	+10
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	11	21	+10
Poland	Law and Justice	44	53	+9

Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. "Support" percentages represent respondents who have a favorable view of each party. "Do not support" percentages represent respondents who have an unfavorable view of each party. For more information on European populist parties, see Appendix. In Sweden, respondents with an unfavorable view of the Sweden Democrats were significantly less likely to respond.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey. Q50f.

"NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States"

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Appendix: Classifying European political parties

Classifying parties as populist

Although experts generally agree that populist political leaders or parties display high levels of anti-elitism, definitions of populism vary. We use three measures to classify populist parties: anti-elite ratings from the [2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey \(CHES\)](#), Inglehart and Norris's [populism party scale](#) and [The PopuList](#). We define a party as populist when at least two of these three measures classify it as such.

CHES, which was carried out in January and February 2018, asked 228 regional experts to evaluate the 2017 positions of 132 European political parties across 14 European Union member states. CHES results are regularly used by academics to classify parties with regard to their left-right ideological leanings, their key party platform positions and their degree of populism, among other things.

We measure anti-elitism using an average of two variables in the CHES data. First, we used “PEOPLE_VS_ELITE,” which asked the experts to measure the parties with regard to their position on direct vs. representative democracy, where 0 means that the parties support elected officeholders making the most important decisions and 10 means that “the people,” not politicians, should make the most important decisions. Second, we used “ANTI-ELITE_SALIENCE,” which is a measure of the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for that particular party, with 0 meaning not at all salient and 10 meaning extremely salient. The average of these two measures is shown in the table below as “anti-elitism.” In all countries, we consider parties that score above a 7.0 as “populist.”

We also used CHES's “FAMILY” variable to further classify populist groups. [Per CHES](#), family attribution is based on a combination of “a) membership or affiliation with [European Parliament] party families, b) ParlGov classifications and c) self-identification.”

Inglehart and Norris emphasize the cultural views of populist parties and created a populist party scale using the [2014 CHES data](#) for classification.¹ This scale aggregates expert ratings of the party on the following positions and attitudes: 1) support for traditional social values, 2) opposition to liberal lifestyles, 3) promotion of nationalism, 4) favorable toward tough law and order, 5) favorable toward assimilation for immigrants and asylum seekers, 6) support for restrictive immigration policies, 7) opposition to more rights for ethnic minorities, 8) support for religious

¹ Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris. 2016. “[Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash](#).” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series.

principles in politics and 9) support for rural interests. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, and parties with a score of more than 80 are classified as populist.

The PopuList is an ongoing project to classify European political parties as populist, far right, far left and/or euroskeptic. [The project](#) specifically looks at parties that “obtained at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998.” It is based on collaboration between academic experts and journalists. The PopuList classifies parties that emphasize the will of the people against the elite as populist.²

Two parties are missing data for at least two of the measures used for classification but are still included for analysis in the report. Vox in Spain is considered a [right-wing populist party](#) by experts, but was not included in any of the measures used due to its relatively [recent rise](#) in popularity. Similarly, [Forum for Democracy \(FvD\)](#) in the Netherlands did not achieve a large enough share of the votes to be included in the PopuList analysis and was founded in 2016, after data collection for the Inglehart and Norris analysis. Experts in the most recent round of CHES classify this party as a right-wing populist party, and its score on the anti-elitism scale exceeds the cut-off.

Classifying parties as left, right or center

We can further classify these traditional and populist parties into three groups: left, right and center. When classifying parties based on ideology, we relied on the variable “LRGEN” in the CHES dataset, which asked experts to rate the positions of each party in terms of its overall ideological stance, with 0 meaning extreme left, 5 meaning center and 10 meaning extreme right. We define left parties as those that score below 4.5 and right parties as those above 5.5. Center parties have ratings between 4.5 and 5.5.

² Mudde, Cas. 2004. “[The Populist Zeitgeist](#).” Government and Opposition.

European populist party classifications

Party	Country	Family	Left-right	Anti-elitism	Inglehart & Norris	The PopuList
Populist parties on the left						
La France Insoumise	France	Radical left	1.0	8.9	--	Populist
Podemos	Spain	Radical left	2.4	8.7	Populist	Populist
Syriza	Greece	Radical left	2.6	7.4	Populist	Populist
Populist parties in the center						
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO 2011)	Czech Rep.	No family	4.9	7.7	Not populist	Populist
Five Star Movement (M5S)	Italy	No family	5.2	9.9	Populist	Populist
Populist parties on the right						
Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO-NOVA)	Slovakia	Conservative	6.9	7.2	Not populist	Populist
Slovak National Party (SNS)	Slovakia	Radical right	7.6	4.1	Populist	Populist
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	Radical right	8.0	8.0	Populist	Populist
Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)	Czech Rep.	Radical right	8.2	9.8	--	Populist
Lega	Italy	Regionalist	8.3	7.8	Populist	Populist
Law and Justice (PiS)	Poland	Radical right	8.3	6.2	Populist	Populist
Kukiz'15	Poland	Radical right	8.3	8.8	--	Populist
Jobbik	Hungary	Radical right	8.5	7.8	Populist	Populist
UK Independence Party (UKIP)	UK	Radical right	8.6	8.2	Populist	Populist
Fidesz	Hungary	Conservative	8.7	5.7	Populist	Populist
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Germany	Radical right	9.2	8.7	Populist	Populist
Party for Freedom (PVV)	Netherlands	Radical right	9.3	9.5	Populist	Populist
Forum for Democracy (FvD)	Netherlands	Radical right	9.5	9.5	--	--
National Rally	France	Radical right	9.7	8.9	Populist	Populist
Vox	Spain	--	--	--	--	--

Notes: Golden Dawn (XA) in Greece not included in analysis due to insufficient sample size. Questions about populist parties were not asked in Bulgaria or Lithuania. Left-right indicates the average score CHES experts gave each party on an 11-point left-right scale. Scores for anti-elitism are an average of party position on direct vs. representative democracy and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within the party. Source: 2017 CHES. Inglehart and Norris (2016). The PopuList (2019).

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Methodology

About Pew Research Center's Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup and Abt Associates. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. More details about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs are [available here](#).

Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center
Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey
February 9, 2020 Release**

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see our [international survey methods database](#).
- The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the United States in the survey:

Group	Unweighted sample size	Weighted %	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	1335	100	3.0 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	638	45	4.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	697	55	4.3 percentage points

- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.